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Comment  Andrew Levin
Over the past decade or so, researchers at academic institutions and cen-
tral banks have been active in specifying and estimating dynamic stochastic 
general equilibrium (DSGE) models that can be used for the analysis of 
monetary policy.1 While the ﬁ  rst generation models were relatively small 
and stylized, more recent models typically embed a much more elaborate 
dynamic structure aimed at capturing key aspects of the aggregate data.2 
Indeed, a number of central banks are now employing DSGE models in the 
forecasting process and in formulating and communicating policy strategies. 
Andrew Levin is associate director of the Division of Monetary Aﬀairs at the Federal 
Reserve Board.
The views expressed in this comment are solely those of the author, and should not be inter-
preted as representing the views of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System nor 
of anyone else associated with the Federal Reserve System.
1. Pioneering early studies include King and Wolman (1996, 1999); Goodfriend and King 
(1997); Rotemberg and Woodford (1997, 1999); Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (1999); and McCal-
lum and Nelson (1999).
2. See Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005); Smets and Wouters (2003); Levin et al. 
(2006); and Schmitt-  Gröhe and Uribe (2006).534    Harald Uhlig
However, a crucial ongoing issue in conducting such analysis is to determine 
the extent to which the policy implications may be sensitive to the particular 
speciﬁ  cation of the behavioral equations, the incidence of the exogenous 
shocks, and the econometric methodology used to estimate the model.
Harald’s chapter follows this approach in addressing an interesting 
and highly relevant topic: he uses a medium-  scale DSGE model to pro-
vide an accounting of the diﬀerences in monetary policy paths that have 
been observed in the euro area and the United States over the past decade. 
While this topic has been considered in two other recent studies—Chris-
tiano, Motto, and Rostagno (2008) and Sahuc and Smets (2008), henceforth 
referred to as CMR and SS, respectively—Harald’s analysis involves distinct 
choices with respect to the model speciﬁ  cation and the empirical approach. 
Thus, the fact that his analysis yields fairly similar results—namely, that the 
diﬀerences in policy paths are largely attributable to the speciﬁ  c shocks that 
have inﬂ  uenced each economy—provides important conﬁ  rmation regarding 
the robustness of that conclusion.
In the remainder of this comment, I will highlight some of the model 
speciﬁ  cation issues and then discuss the estimation results for the parameters 
related to monetary policy. Finally, I will take a somewhat broader perspec-
tive in considering several key factors that have inﬂ  uenced the evolution of 
the U.S. economy over the past decade and the extent to which further work 
is needed to incorporate these inﬂ  uences, perhaps in the next generation of 
DSGE models.
Model Speciﬁ  cation
With twenty-  three endogenous variables, Harald’s model is a bit smaller 
than the CMR model (which has twenty-  nine variables) and substantially 
larger than the SS model (which has “only” nine variables). Of course, a num-
ber of judgmental choices inevitably arise in specifying a model of this scale; 
here I would like to point out four particularly interesting modeling issues:
1.  Harald’s analysis follows the classical q-  theory approach in assuming 
that capital accumulation is subject to adjustment costs that are proportional 
to the squared level of investment, whereas CMR and SS assumed that these 
adjustment costs are proportional to the squared growth rate of investment. 
As emphasized by Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005), the latter spec-
iﬁ  cation has the advantage of being able to generate a hump- shaped response 
of aggregate investment in response to a monetary policy shock, consistent 
with the implications of structural vector autoregressions. Furthermore, 
while the formal microeconomic foundations of higher-  order adjustment 
costs were initially somewhat opaque, Basu and Kimball (2003) have shown 
that this mechanism may be viewed as providing a reduced- form representa-
tion of an underlying framework with planning delays in investment.Monetary Policy in Europe versus the United States    5 3 5
2.  In motivating his study, Harald emphasizes the contrasting patterns 
of corporate ﬁ  nance in the euro area and the United States; namely, business 
investment in Europe is much more likely to be ﬁ  nanced by bank loans rather 
than publicly traded bonds. Nevertheless, credit market frictions are absent 
from Harald’s model, whereas CMR incorporate the debt-  contracting 
framework of Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999), henceforth denoted 
as BGG. From an empirical standpoint, the BGG framework could provide 
a means of gauging whether cross-  country diﬀerences in corporate ﬁ  nance 
are associated with systematic diﬀerences in the steady-  state magnitude of 
the external ﬁ  nance premium. Furthermore, the BGG framework implies 
endogenous variation in the external ﬁ  nance premium in response to the 
equity-  to-  debt ratio—a mechanism that could be particularly important in 
interpreting the evolution of the U.S. economy over a decade of relatively 
large swings in equity prices.
3.  Harald’s study is also motivated by the contrasting structure of labor 
markets in the euro area and the United States; for example, diﬀerences in 
unionization rates, unemployment compensation, and various other aspects 
of labor market regulation and tax policies. In light of these considerations, 
Harald’s model allows for sluggishness in real wage adjustment, following 
the formulation of Blanchard and Galí (2006). In contrast to CMR and SS, 
however, Harald rules out any role for nominal wage inertia in inﬂ  uencing 
the evolution of the macroeconomy.
4.  One other aspect of Harald’s model speciﬁ  cation is also worth noting; 
namely, his formulation of the monetary policy rule. As in the enormous 
literature on Taylor-  style rules, he assumes that the short-  term interest rate 
responds to the lagged interest rate as well as to deviations of inﬂ  ation from 
target; however, he departs from that literature (and from CMR and SS) in 
assuming that policy responds to movements in real marginal cost instead 
of movements in the output gap. Because he assumes that nominal wages are 
completely ﬂ  exible, this distinction is irrelevant in his model; that is, the output 
gap is proportional to the deviation of real marginal cost from steady state. In 
the data, however, there is a much weaker correlation between real marginal 
cost (as measured by the inverse of the labor share) and the Hodrick- Prescott 
(HP)- ﬁ  ltered output gap; hence, compared with more conventional speciﬁ  -
cations, Harald’s approach might yield very diﬀerent empirical implications 
about the extent to which movements in the stance of monetary policy should 
be attributed to systematic versus idiosyncratic components.
Speciﬁ  cation of Exogenous Disturbances
Harald’s empirical approach involves ﬁ  ve exogenous disturbances—
namely, shocks to the level of total factor productivity (TFP), the level of 
investment eﬃciency, the wage markup, the labor tax rate, and the monetary 
policy rule. The number of disturbances is a bit smaller than in the SS model 536    Harald Uhlig
(seven shocks) and noticeably more parsimonious than the CMR model 
(ﬁ  fteen shocks). Of course, the choice of shocks is nontrivial in seeking 
to provide a meaningful accounting for the evolution of macroeconomic 
outcomes in the euro area and the United States over the past decade. For 
example, one could imagine the desirability of including persistent shocks 
to the growth rates of TFP and investment eﬃciency that might enable 
the model to match the “new economy” experience of the United States 
more closely. Similarly, as discussed further following, the model might 
need to allow for exogenous time variation in government spending and 
in the public debt target in order to capture the evolution of U.S. ﬁ  scal 
policy. Finally, a number of observers have used the term “opportunis-
tic disinﬂ  ation” to characterize U.S. monetary policy from the late 1980s 
through the late 1990s, suggesting that the model might also need to allow 
for gradual time variation in the implicit inﬂ  ation goal, as in the CMR and 
SS models.
Speciﬁ  cation of Observed Variables
The number of observed time series in Harald’s chapter matches the num-
ber of exogenous disturbances (as in SS and CMR), thereby facilitating 
inference about the actual incidence of shocks hitting each economy during 
the sample period. Thus, with only ﬁ  ve shocks, Harald evidently faced some 
fairly diﬃcult choices in picking a speciﬁ  c set of ﬁ  ve observed variables: the 
consumption share of gross domestic product (GDP); labor productivity 
(that is, output per worker); the inﬂ  ation rate of the GDP price deﬂ  ator; 
the short-  term nominal interest rate; and the ratio of government debt to 
GDP. A few comments are worth noting regarding this selection of observed 
variables:
1. In stark contrast to SS and CMR, Harald’s empirical speciﬁ  cation 
does not employ any direct measure of real GDP growth or HP-  ﬁ  ltered 
levels of output or employment. Thus, the interpretation of some key mac-
roeconomic ﬂ  uctuations (such as the downturn in U.S. economic activity in 
2001) is based on inferences from movements in labor productivity and the 
consumption share.
2.  Given Harald’s objective of analyzing the role of credit market imper-
fections in the evolution of the macroeconomy, it might have been ideal if the 
empirical analysis could have included some measure(s) of domestic credit 
and/  or risk premiums on corporate debt.
3.  Harald’s analysis follows the bulk of the empirical DSGE literature in 
measuring inﬂ  ation in terms of the GDP price deﬂ  ator, which reﬂ  ects value 
added rather than the actual prices charged for goods and services. However, 
it should be noted that oil import price shocks can have a perverse impact 
on this measure of inﬂ  ation, because a value added deﬂ  ator puts positive 
weight on output price changes and negative weight on input price changes.Monetary Policy in Europe versus the United States    5 3 7
4. Finally, while the consumption share of GDP may be reasonably 
viewed as stationary for the Euro Area, this series is clearly not stationary 
for the United States; that is, the savings rate exhibits a stochastic trend over 
the two decades of the sample period, and hence the series should presum-
ably be HP-  ﬁ  ltered rather than simply demeaned. Moreover, a stochastic 
trend is present in the relative price of consumption goods versus invest-
ment goods; hence, as shown in ﬁ  gure 9C.1 of this comment, the ratio of 
chain- weighted real consumption to chain- weighted real GDP (the measure 
used in Harald’s analysis) is systematically diﬀerent from the nominal con-
sumption share of nominal GDP, with potentially important implications 
for the estimation results and the interpretation of recent macroeconomic 
developments.3
Estimated Parameters
Although it would be interesting to discuss the entire set of parameter 
estimates, in light of the space constraints I will simply make a few remarks 
about the inferences regarding the parameters of the monetary policy rule:
it   ζiLit 1   (1   ζiL)[ζ   ˆt   ζxmc  
t   uit].
As previously noted, the policy rate it is adjusted in response to its own 
lagged value as well as to the current inﬂ  ation rate   ˆt and to real marginal 
cost mc  
t, where each variable is expressed in percentage points, and the hat 
indicates that the variable is measured as a deviation from steady state.
For both the euro area and the United States, the parameter estimates 
Fig. 9C.1    The evolution of the U.S. consumption share of GDP
3. With nonstationary relative prices, the ratio of chain- weighted real consumption to chain- 
weighted real GDP does not have any clear economic interpretation; for further discussion, see 
Whelan (2000); Edge, Laubach, and Williams (2004); and Smets and Wouters (2007).538    Harald Uhlig
for ζ  are only slightly larger than unity, implying that monetary policy 
in each economy has responded only weakly to inﬂ  ation over the past two 
decades, and indeed has barely even satisﬁ  ed the Taylor principle. However, 
this ﬁ  nding contrasts sharply with conventional wisdom and with most pre-
vious empirical studies. For example, Smets and Wouters (2003) employed 
the following speciﬁ  cation of the monetary policy rule in their analysis of 
euro area data:
it    iLit 1   (1    iL)[  ˆt 1     (  ˆt 1    ∗
t 1)    yy ˆt 1] 
        ˆt     y y ˆt 1   εit,
and obtained a posterior mean of 1.7 for   , while Levin et al. (2006) used 
the same policy rule speciﬁ  cation in analyzing U.S. data and obtained a 
posterior mean of 2.7 for ζ ; using Harald’s notation, these estimates would 
imply that ζ  has a value of about 3 for the euro area and about 4 for the 
United States.
Several factors may be relevant in explaining these contrasting results. 
First, as already noted, Harald’s speciﬁ  cation assumes that monetary policy 
responds to movements in real marginal cost, whereas the policy rule speci-
ﬁ  cation in most other studies involves some explicit measure of the output 
gap. Second, Harald’s formulation explains any remaining higher-  order 
dynamics of monetary policy in terms of serially correlated disturbances 
to the policy rule, whereas other recent studies ﬁ  nd that policy responds 
signiﬁ  cantly not only to levels but also to changes in the inﬂ  ation rate and 
the output gap. Finally, Harald’s speciﬁ  cation assumes a constant inﬂ  ation 
target, whereas other recent studies have allowed the central bank’s inﬂ  a-
tion objective to vary over time. This assumption could have signiﬁ  cant 
consequences for characterizing the evolution of monetary policy in each 
economy, because the average inﬂ  ation rate for the synthetic euro area exhib-
ited a gradual decline in conjunction with the approach to European Mon-
etary Union, while the U.S. inﬂ  ation rate exhibited a signiﬁ  cant downward 
shift in the early 1990s that some observers have described as opportunistic 
disinﬂ  ation.4
Interpreting the Evolution of the U.S. Economy
Now I would like to take a somewhat broader perspective in discussing 
several factors that have had important inﬂ  uences on the evolution of the 
U.S. economy over the past decade. I hope that these comments will be 
useful in highlighting some signiﬁ  cant issues with respect to the speciﬁ  ca-
tion of the behavioral equations and the disturbances in empirical DSGE 
models.
4. Levin and Piger (2004) report evidence of downward shifts in euro area and U.S. inﬂ  ation 
rates in the early 1990s, while Orphanides and Wilcox (2002) discuss the characteristics of 
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1.  The U.S. economy experienced a remarkably large swing in productiv-
ity growth over the past decade. The upward part of this swing has often 
been referred to as the “new economy” era, but fewer commentators seem 
to have emphasized that this era has apparently now drawn to a close. Thus, 
while Harald’s model—as in a number of other empirical DSGE studies—
is speciﬁ  ed in terms of shocks to the level of productivity, it seems that 
allowing for persistent shocks to the growth rate of productivity would be 
important in accounting for the recent evolution of the macroeconomy. 
Furthermore, Harald’s analysis—like most other studies—assumes that 
every shock to the economy can be immediately observed by private agents 
and policymakers, whereas the reality is that even professional forecasters 
face a substantial real- time challenge in distinguishing persistent swings in 
productivity growth from the more common variety of transitory ﬂ  uctua-
tions. For example, Tetlow and Ironside (2007) have recently documented 
the magnitude of the revisions in FRB/  US model-  based assessments of the 
path of U.S. potential GDP growth. For illustrative purposes, ﬁ  gure 9C.2 of 
this comment depicts ﬁ  ve vintages of these FRB/ US assessments and under-
scores the extent to which the characteristics of the initial upward swing in 
productivity growth were not obvious at its onset in the mid-  1990s, while 
the more recent downturn in potential output growth was not apparent in 
the real- time assessments that were constructed in early 2001 and mid- 2003. 
Given this pattern of revisions, it seems clear that the next generation of 
DSGE models needs to incorporate real-  time data ﬁ  ltering as well as other 
forms of learning about the structure and state of the economy.
2.  The U.S. ﬁ  scal outlook has also been subject to dramatic swings over the 
past decade. For example, at a Congressional hearing in early 2001, Chair-
man Greenspan summarized the ﬁ  scal outlook at that juncture: “Indeed, 
Fig. 9C.2    Real-  time assessments of U.S. potential GDP growth540    Harald Uhlig
in almost any credible baseline scenario, short of a major and prolonged 
economic contraction, the full beneﬁ  ts of debt reduction are now achieved 
before the end of this decade[ . . . ]The time has come, in my judgment, to 
consider a budgetary strategy that is consistent with a preemptive smooth-
ing of the glide path to zero federal debt or, more realistically, to the level 
of federal debt that is an eﬀective irreducible minimum” (Greenspan 2001).
Nevertheless, as shown in ﬁ  gure 9C.3 of this comment, the ratio of U.S. 
government debt to GDP has not declined toward zero as projected, but in 
fact has increased noticeably over the past half-  decade or so. This outcome 
reﬂ  ects the combined inﬂ  uences of the tax reduction measures that were 
adopted in early 2001 (partly in response to rosy ﬁ  scal projections) and 
the increased government expenditures that have occurred in the wake of 
the 9/  11 terrorist attacks. The shock to U.S. real government consumption 
spending is also visible in the left panel of ﬁ  gure 9.3 of Harald’s chapter; 
however, his empirical speciﬁ  cation only involves shocks to the tax rate, not 
to government spending. Figure 9C.3 of this comment also highlights the 
extent to which the U.S. government debt/  GDP ratio does not appear to 
be mean stationary, at least not over the four decades from 1965 to 2005. 
Thus, to provide a reasonable empirical accounting for the evolution of 
government debt in a DSGE framework, one might need to incorporate 
some combination of shocks to the debt target or perhaps some form of 
nonlinear error correction mechanisms in the determination of government 
spending and taxes.
3.  As noted previously, the BGG framework provides a means of gaug-
ing the evolution of credit market frictions over the past decade. In par-
ticular, while the wedge between the cost of external and internal ﬁ  nance 
is not directly observable, the cross-  section and time-  series behavior of this 
premium have recently been estimated by Levin, Natalucci, and Zakrajsek 
(2004), using a novel panel data set that includes balance sheet information, 
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measures of expected default risk, and credit spreads on publicly-  traded 
debt for about 800 U.S. ﬁ  rms.
As shown in ﬁ  gure 9C.4 of this comment, the external ﬁ  nance premium 
for the sales-  weighted median ﬁ  rm in this sample was negligible during the 
expansionary periods of 1997 to 1999 and 2003 to 2004, but increased mark-
edly in mid-  2000 (prior to the onset of the 2001 recession) and remained 
elevated until the end of 2002. Indeed, the cost of external ﬁ  nance rose even 
more sharply for the upper seventy-  ﬁ  fth percentile of the cross-  sectional 
distribution; that is, for ﬁ  rms in the sample representing one- fourth of total 
sales. Given that these estimates are based on ﬁ  nancial data for relatively 
large ﬁ  rms with publicly traded equity and debt, one may well presume that 
smaller ﬁ  rms would tend to face even larger swings in the external ﬁ  nance 
premium or perhaps face credit rationing due to collateral constraints—a 
mechanism not incorporated in the BGG framework. Thus, incorporating 
credit market frictions into empirical DSGE models (such as CMR) should 
be a priority for further research.
4.  Over the past few years, there have also been substantial swings in the 
U.S. inﬂ  ation outlook. For example, in early 2004, Chairman Greenspan 
gave an address to the American Economic Association in which he stated, 
“A two- decade long decline in inﬂ  ation . . . eventually brought us to the cur-
rent state of price stability[ . . . ]Our goal of price stability was achieved by 
most analysts’ deﬁ  nition by mid-  2003. Unstinting and largely preemptive 
eﬀorts over two decades had ﬁ  nally paid oﬀ” (Greenspan 2004).
As shown in ﬁ  gure 9C.5, real- time data at that point in time indicated that 
core inﬂ  ation—as measured by the annual average inﬂ  ation rate for personal 
consumption expenditures (PCE), excluding food and energy—had fallen 
Fig. 9C.4    The evolution of the U.S. external ﬁ  nance premium542    Harald Uhlig
to around 1 percent as of mid-  2003. Thus, assuming that this measure of 
inﬂ  ation exhibits an upward bias of about 50 basis points or more due to 
unobserved improvements in the quality of goods and services, it would 
certainly be reasonable to infer that the true underlying rate of consumer 
inﬂ  ation was quite close to zero; that is, “price stability.” In contrast, more 
recent vintages of data have led to a markedly diﬀerent inﬂ  ation outlook, 
partly because the core PCE inﬂ  ation rates for 2003 and 2004 were subse-
quently revised upwards by nearly 75 basis points, and partly because the 
post- 2001 decline in core inﬂ  ation turned out to be largely transitory. These 
developments highlight the extent to which the implications of real-  time 
data—and the subsequent revision process—need to be incorporated into 
the next generation of empirical DSGE models.
5.  Finally, it should be noted that Harald’s analysis (like most other recent 
studies) assumes that the central bank’s inﬂ  ation goal is completely trans-
parent and credible to the private sector. This assumption might be reason-
able in some empirical contexts; for example, from 1976 through 1998, the 
Deutsche Bundesbank regularly communicated to the public regarding its 
medium- term  inﬂ  ation objective, and expectations regarding the German 
inﬂ  ation outlook appear to have been ﬁ  rmly anchored over this period.5 
However, evidence from ﬁ  nancial market data and surveys of professional 
forecasters suggests that in recent years U.S. long- run inﬂ  ation expectations 
have not been as ﬁ  rmly anchored as in other economies—such as the euro 
area, Sweden, and the United Kingdom—where the central bank has a more 
explicit inﬂ  ation objective.6
For example, as shown in ﬁ  gure 9C.6 of this comment, the cross- sectional 
dispersion of professional forecasters’ long-  run inﬂ  ation expectations has 
Fig. 9C.5    The real-  time evolution of the U.S. core PCE inﬂ  ation rate
5. See Coenen, Levin, and Christoﬀel (2007).
6. See Levin, Natalucci, and Piger (2004); Gürkaynak, Levin, and Swanson (2007); and 
Beechey, Johannsen, and Levin (2007).Monetary Policy in Europe versus the United States    5 4 3
been noticeably greater in the United States than in the euro area; indeed, in 
late 2006, the standard deviation across forecasters was only 0.1 percent for 
the Euro Area and 0.4 to 0.5 percent for the United States.7 In this light, it is 
worth noting that the Federal Reserve has recently implemented signiﬁ  cant 
enhancements to its communication strategy, including the regular publi-
cation of Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) members’ forecasts 
for consumer inﬂ  ation three years ahead—a horizon that provides further 
information about each member’s assessment of the inﬂ  ation rate that best 
promotes the Federal Reserve’s dual mandate of price stability and maxi-
mum sustainable employment.8
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